Sunni province out of time | The Middle East

It is past time for the Sunnis to boycott the parliamentary elections or to suspend political life in Lebanon. The uprising of the people with all their political orientations and schools of thought, even their simple feelings, no longer allowed any of the pillars of the ruling system to reap the glory of the boycott and suspension.
This is a step that the politician takes from a position of struggle and confrontation, not from a popularly condemned position, regardless of the exaggerations involved in this condemnation, or the inaccuracy in distributing responsibilities on the subject of the condemnation.
In the history of the experience of the “Future Movement” and its leader, there were 3 strategic stations to turn the table, an honorable exit from the game of power and forced coexistence with the “Hezbollah” militia, before the forced exit, which is intended to be colored today in the colors of the uprising and counter-revolution…
1 – On this month, 14 years ago, the Lebanese experienced the so-called “May 7”, when the “Hezbollah” militia, on May 7, 2008, invaded Beirut and Mount Lebanon, in cooperation with the “Amal Militia” and the Syrian Social Nationalist Party Some of the remnants of the “Resistance Brigades”.
The limited military operation ended with the government’s reversal of decisions it had taken regarding the communications network of the “Hezbollah militia”, then reconciliation took place in Doha, and an agreement was signed bearing the name of the Qatari capital. It constituted, in its political content, the most dangerous indirect amendment process to the Lebanese Constitution, by imposing new norms, most notably the acceptance of the militia obtaining the right of veto within the Council of Ministers (the blocking third), and the inclusion of the phrase “the triptych of the army, the people and the resistance” in all ministerial statements, as a decisive recognition The role and identity of “Hezbollah” and granting its arms an overt constitutional cover.
Instead of suspending and boycotting that day, and refusing to go to Doha, the Future Party decided, with all its pillars, and solidarity and solidarity with the rest of the main parties, in what was known as the “March 14” front, to engage in the experience of appeasing the party and its weapons and continuing forced coexistence with it and its conditions.
2 – After the “March 14” victory in the 2009 parliamentary elections and the formation of Prime Minister Saad Hariri’s post-election government, and his first government, a major political battle erupted over the settlements proposed by Hezbollah for the file of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, looking into the assassination of Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, which ended with the overthrow of the The government announced the resignation of one-third of its members (remember, dear reader, that this is one of the rules of the Doha Agreement, which recognized the force of arms).
What happened after the dismissal was that the Hezbollah militia symbolically recalled its willingness to repeat the “May 7” experience, which led to MP Walid Jumblatt changing his political position and naming President Najib Mikati in the parliamentary consultations to form the government in place of Saad Hariri. The course of the two weeks between the overthrow of the Hariri government and the prime ministership of Najib Mikati, Hariri described it at that time as a new political assassination attempt, but instead of suspending his participation in the consultations, and declaring a boycott of political action from within the institutions under the sway of intimidation of arms, and consequently withholding the Sunni charter from “political assassination consultations.” He decided, along with his main staff, to participate in the constitutional game, which gave full legitimacy to the second coup of Hezbollah.
3 – The battle of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon to consider the crime of assassination of Rafik Hariri was one of the most costly battles in the history of the contemporary Lebanese experience. A group of the highest Lebanese media, political and security elites were assassinated in the context of the battle to prevent, overthrow and disrupt them. The country was disrupted for many years, institutions were closed, the economy was executed, and the capital and its center were systematically destroyed as a symbolic extension of the liquidation of Hariri’s political legacy.
However, in all the sections of the Special Court, especially after the issuance of the indictment accusing specific elements in the “Hezbollah” militia of conspiring and carrying out the assassination crime, and then after the issuance of the clear and reasoned verdict, the position of the Future Movement (not Saad Hariri alone) was to continue the game Coexistence with Hezbollah.
I remember the extent of frustration with “future” statements about protecting civil peace, and the like, in the first minutes that followed the sentencing of Salim Ayyash in The Hague. Ayyash, according to a “statement issued by the US State Department,” is a Hezbollah leader and “a prominent activist in Hezbollah’s Unit 121, an assassination squad that receives its orders directly from Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah.”
After the May 7 coup, then the coup against the Hariri government and its constitutional right to form a government as prime minister with an impeccable parliamentary majority, the ruling station was an opportunity to announce an exit from occupied Lebanese political life by force of arms and the logic of organized crime, and to declare political disobedience, as an honorable and noble struggle entry to reformulate Rules of political and national action in Lebanon.
They are all stations that require suspension, reluctance or disobedience, let alone other stations, such as the central assassinations that affected the spinal cord of Saad Hariri, especially the assassinations of Major General Wissam al-Hassan in 2012 and after him, Dr. Muhammad Chatah in 2013.
This is a time that has passed, and it will not return, and the political boycott that could have been a better bridge towards Lebanon, or an instrument of innocence at a minimum accusation of exaggerating forced coexistence with the weapon of treachery, is today nothing but an expression of anger or frustration or a settling mechanism that belongs to the another time.
If there is a province worth monitoring, it is the silent Shiite boycott that worries Hezbollah and pushes it to raise the degree of electoral alertness to its highest levels. It is clear from the statements of senior Hezbollah officials and a number of videos circulating on social media, and the subsequent attempts to besiege the families of their owners, that Hezbollah is concerned about the scenario of a great lack of turnout. The Shiite objection, in front of the power of arms, does not have the luxury of active and public objection. As in Iran and its recent elections, the low turnout will be the most prominent figure by which the immunity of the Hezbollah militia project is measured.
Between the noise of the Sunni boycott outside time, and the silence of the Shiite boycott, which falls in a new Shiite era from Iran to Iraq to Lebanon, there is another feature, the Christian-Christian rivalry, which alone is still considered the last sign of the remnants of Lebanese democracy; Where the elections are real, the projects are clear, and the conflict is tempting to follow up and wait.